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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brant Lee Eversole appeals from his judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence, entered upon a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he challenges the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the district court's denial of his
motion to dismiss.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On April 16, 2011, at about 11 :30 p.m., police contacted Eversole in front of
Collet's Bar in Firth, Idaho. (Tr., 1 p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.7.) Eversole was in a pickup truck
with his back wheels spinning, high centered on a brick berm which separated the bar
from the highway. (Tr., p.6, L.8 - p.7, L.16.) Two other individuals were trying to help
Eversole get off of the berm. (Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, L.4.)
Eversole told police that another driver had pushed his truck onto the berm, but
police found no evidence to substantiate that claim. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-12.) As the officers
spoke with Eversole, they detected the odor of alcohol and noted that Eversole's eyes
were red and glassy. (R., p.14.) The police asked Eversole to perform standard field
sobriety tests (FSTs). (Id.) After failing two FSTs, Eversole refused to continue testing.
(Id.) The officers arrested Eversole on suspicion of driving under the influence. (R.,
pp.14, 170.) After officers read Eversole his license suspension advisory, he refused to
submit to a breath test.

(R., pp.15, 170.)

Officers then transported Eversole to

There are multiple volumes of transcripts on appeal. Citations to "Tr." herein refer to
the transcript which contains the hearings on Eversole's motion to dismiss and motion
to suppress.
1
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Bingham Memorial Hospital where his blood was drawn.

(R., pp.15, 61, 170.) The

blood test revealed a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.279. (R., pp.60-61.)
The state charged Eversole with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.4950.) Eversole filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the vehicle was not subject
to being readily made operable at the time the Defendant was arrested under suspicion
of DUI." (R., pp.92-93.) The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. (Tr.,
pp.4-25.) The district court, finding that the pickup was reasonably capable of being
rendered operable, denied the motion. (See Tr., p.21, L.1 - p.22, L.2; R., pp.138-39.)
Eversole filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood draw, arguing that it
was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

(R., pp.148-59.)

The state

argued that the blood draw was supported by the warrant exceptions of implied consent
and exigency. (R., pp.160-66.) The parties stipulated to the motion's underlying facts.
(R., pp.170-71.)

The district court determined that, though the blood draw was not

supported by exigent circumstances, it was supported by the valid warrant exception of
implied consent and denied Eversole's motion. (R., pp.173-80.)
Pursuant to a binding conditional plea agreement, Eversole pleaded guilty
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), reserving his right to appeal
the denial of his pre-judgment motions. (R., pp.190-97.) Eversole then filed an untimely
motion to reconsider the denial of his suppression motion on the basis of the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, _

U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 1552

(2013). (R., p.202.) The state objected on the ground that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to consider the motion because it was untimely and because Eversole had
already pleaded guilty. (R., pp.252-53.)

2

The district court denied the motion to reconsider (R., p.263) and entered
judgment against Eversole, sentencing him to a unified term of six years with three
years fixed, but retaining jurisdiction (R., pp.268-70). Eversole filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.272-73.)
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ISSUES

Eversole states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to
suppress?
2.
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to
dismiss?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Eversole failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress?
2.
Has Eversole failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to dismiss?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Eversole Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Below, Eversole filed a motion to suppress evidence gained from his blood draw

asserting that the blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.148-59.)
The district court held that the blood draw fell within the well settled and valid implied
consent exception to the warrant requirement and denied Eversole's motion.

(R.,

pp.173-80.) On appeal, Eversole contends that the district court erred by denying his
suppression motion.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-18.)

Application of the correct legal

standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

5

C.

Requiring Eversole To Submit To A Blood Draw Was Justified By The Implied
Consent Exception
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement is consent, which
may be implied under Idaho's implied consent statute. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d
215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 2008).
The district court held that the blood draw was justified by implied consent,
recognizing that this case is controlled by Idaho Supreme Court precedent as
articulated in Diaz. (R., pp.173-80, see also 5/28/2013 Tr., p.16, L.13 - p.17, L.8.) In
that case, Diaz verbally refused the requested blood draw. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 301, 160
P.3d at 740. The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged Diaz's argument that there was
no exigency that would justify the warrantless blood draw, but that was "not the lone
applicable exception here; consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement."

kl at 302,

160 P.3d at 741. "Because Diaz had already given his implied

consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a
blood draw. Without addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw, we hold
that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement."

kl

at 303, 160 P.3d at 742.
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Because the procedure was "done in a

medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force" the police acted
reasonably "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances."

kt

Eversole argues that the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Diaz has been
abrogated by the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Missouri v. McNeely,
_U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). McNeely does not affect Idaho's implied consent
provision.

In McNeely, the only question before the Court was "whether the natural

metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood
testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court held that
"exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances."

kt

Thus, the issue was limited to "nonconsensual blood testing"

(emphasis added) and the holding was limited to the exigent circumstances exception.
Moreover, in addressing whether a case-by-case analysis under the exigency exception
would "undermine the governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving
offenses," the Court specifically stated that states would still "have a broad range of
legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without
undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent laws."

kt

at 1565-66.

Far from holding that the state may not legally imply consent by a

motorist, the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws.
Eversole contends that implied consent is not a valid exception to the Fourth
Amendment, arguing that consent must be affirmative and revocable. (Appellant's brief,
pp.12-13.) But Idaho is not the only jurisdiction that recognizes implied consent; the
United States Supreme Court has long recognized the exception as well.
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As noted

above, this includes in McNeely, where the Supreme Court recognized that implied
consent laws are among the "broad range of legal tools" used to enforce drunk-driving
laws.

133 S.Ct. at 1565-66. The Court has also held that implied consent license

suspension procedures do not violate due process, Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112
(1983), and that evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood test under implied
consent laws is constitutionally admissible evidence of his guilt, North Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553 (1983).

If anything short of affirmative consent for a blood draw is

contrary to the Fourth Amendment, then it is inconceivable that suspending a driver's
license for exercising that constitutional right is consistent with due process, or that
exercising a constitutional right to withhold consent would be admissible evidence of
guilt.

Eversole's argument that implied consent is not a valid Fourth Amendment

exception is irreconcilable with United States Supreme Court precedent.
Eversole also argues that because the Supreme Court of the United States in
McNeely rejected a per se test for exigent circumstances and applied a totality of the
circumstances test, the implied consent exception upheld in Diaz is no longer valid.
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-16.) This argument fails on several levels, the most obvious
being that the Idaho Supreme Court in Diaz in fact applied the totality of the
circumstances test.

~

at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. The totality of those circumstances

included that the facts known to the officer provided probable cause to believe Diaz was
under the influence, that Diaz drove on an Idaho road, and that the officers did not
employ unreasonable force.

~

at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42. It is actually Eversole

who advocates for a bright line rule: that a blood draw is always unreasonable absent
the affirmative consent of the defendant.

8

In support of his argument, Eversole also cites State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609
(Ariz. 2013). (See Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) In that case the Arizona Supreme Court
noted that its state implied consent law required the officer "to ask the arrestee to
submit to the test, and the arrestee may then refuse by declining to expressly agree to
take the test." Butler, 302 P.3d at 613. The officer complied with that requirement, but
the express consent he ultimately obtained was deemed involuntary under the facts of
that case.

kl at 613-14.

The Butler case, however, is easily distinguishable from Idaho law.

Unlike

Arizona law, where consent is obtained at the time of the test, under Idaho law implied
consent is obtained at the time of driving.

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742

(Diaz gave consent "by driving on an Idaho road"). There is no evidence whatsoever
that any police officer or other agent of the state compelled Eversole to give his implied
consent by driving on an Idaho road while under the influence.

The totality of the

circumstances shows an entirely voluntary consent.
Diaz is completely consistent with Fourth Amendment standards.

Eversole

voluntarily gave his implied consent by driving. He was not legally entitled to withdraw
that consent. The totality of the circumstances included that police had probable cause
to believe Eversole had been operating (or attempting to operate) a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol and did not employ force, much less unreasonable force, to
effectuate the blood draw.

There is nothing constitutionally unreasonable about the

police action in obtaining evidence of Eversole's guilt of felony DUI.
Finally, Eversole argues that Diaz and other cases upholding the implied consent
exception should be overruled, claiming that they are inconsistent with constitutional

9

standards that consent be voluntary and that the government cannot inhibit the ability to
withdraw that consent.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.)

respect for its own precedents.

Idaho jurisprudence requires

The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling

precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to
be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43
P.3d 765, 768 (2002). As shown above, implied consent laws are not only consistent
with constitutional standards, they have routinely been recognized as valid by the
United States Supreme Court. See, ~ . McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565-66, Batchelder,
463 U.S. 1112; Neville, 459 U.S. 553. Eversole has failed to show that Diaz, or any
other Idaho case recognizing implied consent as an exception to the warrant
requirement, is inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Ultimately, Eversole argues that because the United States Supreme Court ruled
in McNeely that the body's natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood does not create
a per se exigency, Idaho's implied consent laws must be overruled. But this Court has
clearly stated that implied consent and exigent circumstances are different exceptions to
the warrant requirement.

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 ("Exigency,

however, is not the lone applicable exception here; consent is also a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.").

Implied Consent applies regardless of the

applicability of the exigency exception. kL_; see also DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 712-13, 184
P.3d at 218-19 ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was inapplicable, the
blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent.").

Requiring Eversole to

submit to a blood draw was valid under the implied consent exception to the warrant
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requirement.

The district court correctly denied Eversole's suppression motion and

should be affirmed.

11.
Eversole Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
"Mindful of the district court's factual findings," Eversole contends that the district

court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss his criminal prosecution.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the facts

found by the district court shows no abuse of the district court's discretion in denying
Eversole's motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal

action for an abuse of discretion." State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778, 275
P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304, 92 P.3d 551, 554
(Ct. App. 2004); I.C.R. 48(a)).

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Eversole's Motion To Dismiss, Reserving The
Issue Of His Vehicle's Operability To The Jury
Below, Eversole filed a motion to dismiss his prosecution for driving under the

influence, alleging that his vehicle was stuck on a "brick burm" when law enforcement
arrived and was therefore inoperable. (R., pp.92-93.) In State v. Adams, 142 Idaho
305, 127 P.3d 208 (Ct. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that the DUI statute is not
violated when the vehicle is inoperable.

kl at 308,
11

127 P.3d at 211. The court went on

to explain, however, that a vehicle is not considered inoperable "when the reason for a
vehicle's inoperability is a temporary condition that can be quickly remedied."

ilt

This

"distinguishes a car that runs out of gas on a major freeway near several exits and gas
stations from a car with a cracked block which renders it 'totally inoperable."'

ilt

(citation omitted).
At the evidentiary hearing held on Eversole's motions, the district court made the
following factual findings:
In this case, the evidence is that the defendant's vehicle was stuck
on a berm in front of Collet's Bar in Firth, Idaho, which is in Bingham
County; that the officer saw the vehicle stuck on the berm. Two
individuals were attempting to help get [Eversole] off the berm, and the
wheels were spinning when [the officer] made contact. He also testified
that, with some assistance, the vehicle could have been removed from the
berm.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.4-12.) The court concluded that this was like running out of gas in an area
where you can get gas. (Tr., p.21, Ls.15-20.) "It was just a matter of getting a little
more time to get [Eversole's vehicle] off of the berm," and it would have been operable.
(Tr., p.21, L.21 - p.22, L.1)

The court denied Eversole's motion, holding that the

question of operability was for the jury. (Tr., p.22, L.2.)
The district court was correct.

As the Court of Appeals has previously held,

where "there is evidence from which a fact-finder could sensibly conclude that the
vehicle was reasonably capable of being rendered operable, the issue is for the jury."
Adams, 142 Idaho at 308, 127 P.3d at 211. Under the facts of this case, as found by
the district court, "a fact-finder could sensibly conclude that the vehicle was reasonably
capable of being rendered operable," therefore "the issue [was] for the jury." The district
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court properly denied Eversole's motion to dismiss his prosecution and the court should
be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders
denying Eversole's motion to suppress evidence and motion to dismiss.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2014.
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